You cannot use fire to shut down a fire!’ This strategy is bound to be a failureThe situation in Balochistan suggests that!

Pak Army is climbing a steep hill because they jumped out of the frying Pan and Into the fire and thus are up a Creek without a paddle! The situation in Balochistan suggests that!

The Background:

-Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest and westernmost province, spans 44 percent of its landmass yet remains its most sparsely populated and politically marginalized region, home to just 14.8 million of Pakistan’s 240 million people. Despite its strategic significance, Balochistan suffers from federal underrepresentation, resource exploitation, and coercive policies rooted in its colonial past.

-Balochistan has long been at the center of tensions between the federal government and Baloch nationalist movements, stemming from political marginalization, economic exploitation, and state repression.

• Despite its rich natural resources and strategic location, it remains one of Pakistan’s most underdeveloped and volatile regions. These tensions have periodically erupted into armed conflict, with the current insurgency gaining momentum in the early 2000s.

-A major turning point occurred in 2006 with the killing of Akbar Bugti, a veteran political leader and tumandar (leader) of the Bugti tribe, who had served as Chief Minister, Governor, and Federal Minister of State.

-His death at the hands of the Pakistan Army over political disagreements ignited a low-level separatist movement that soon escalated into a protracted conflict. Over time, sporadic attacks on security forces and infrastructure evolved into full-scale guerrilla warfare, with targeted assassinations and bombings against state and military installations.

• By 2022, militant groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) escalated their attacks, primarily targeting the Pakistan Army, Rangers, and Frontier Corps.

-These groups, largely dominated by the Marri and Bugti tribes, operate from safe havens in Afghanistan, driven by long standing grievances over resource exploitation, identity politics, and federal mismanagement.

-Balochistan’s internal divisions along tribal, linguistic, sectarian, and class lines have historically fragmented its political landscape.

-However, the Pakistan Army’s heavy-handed tactics, including collective punishment, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, have deepened resentment and, paradoxically, fostered greater unity among disparate Baloch factions.

-These groups range from moderates advocating for political rights to hardline separatists demanding full independence, yet their shared opposition to state repression has drawn them together.

-Traditionally, the Baloch middle class—concentrated in Karachi and along the Makran coast—remained distant from tribal militant movements. However, growing disillusionment with state policies has radicalized this group, leading many into human rights advocacy and fueling demands for greater political freedoms. As a result, an uneasy yet potent coalition has emerged, where armed resistance and peaceful activism exist in parallel, each reinforcing the broader struggle against state repression.

-2024 saw a significant uptick in violence in Balochistan. In August alone, approximately seventy-four people were killed, including fourteen soldiers. In October, an attack near Karachi airport injured at least ten people, including two Chinese nationals.

-The following month, a suicide bombing at Quetta Railway Station claimed thirty-two lives and injured fifty-five others. The BLA claimed responsibility for these attacks, which increasingly target infrastructure, Chinese workers, Punjabi civilians, and military personnel. Afghanistan’s ungoverned spaces provide insurgents access to abandoned American weaponry, further intensifying the conflict. Despite government claims of a weakened insurgency, the latest attacks demonstrate the insurgents’ capacity for coordinated, high-impact operations.

-In response, the federal government, under pressure from Beijing to safeguard Chinese workers, has launched yet another military offensive against Baloch militants.

-However, this heavy-handed approach has backfired, exacerbating the crisis, uniting various Baloch factions, and strengthening their resolve against the state.

-While the military formally acknowledges human rights advocacy as legitimate, its continued reliance on coercion contradicts this stance and further alienates the population.

-Balochistan’s persistent insurgency stems not from external interference or mere tribal opposition, as the Pakistani government often claims, but from Islamabad’s exploitative policies and the erosion of federalism.

• Rather than embracing a decentralized governance structure, the central government has sought hegemonic control, evident in the pervasive influence of the military and the security agencies over governance, development, and law enforcement. This dominance undermines elected provincial leadership, further centralizing power and marginalizing regional autonomy.

-A key driver of unrest is Islamabad’s treatment of Balochistan as a resource-rich periphery, prioritized for extraction rather than development. Projects such as the Sui Gas Fields and the Saindak and Reko Diq mines generate significant revenue for the federal government, yet the province receives minimal returns.

-Despite constitutional provisions granting provinces control over their natural resources, Balochistan remains economically sidelined, deepening local resentment.

-The erosion of federal autonomy has been exacerbated by repeated violations of constitutional principles, particularly those enshrined in the Eighteenth Amendment, which expanded provincial rights and devolved power.

-The current insurgency was ignited by President General Pervez Musharraf’s unilateral decision in 2002 to construct Gwadar Port, bypassing key constitutional structures such as the National Assembly, the Council of Common Interest, and the Balochistan Provincial government.

-Akbar Bugti, leader of the Jamhoori Wattan Party and a vocal critic of the project, opposed its construction due to concerns over internal migration and its impact on provincial politics.

• He also demanded guarantees that the port’s development would benefit local communities through employment opportunities. Negotiations with a Senate Committee led by Mushahid Hussain were nearing consensus when Musharraf, frustrated by the slow progress, launched a military operation in Dera Bugti in 2005.

-This offensive forced Bugti and his supporters into hiding, culminating in his death at the hands of security forces in 2006. His killing ignited a low-level insurgency for Baloch independence that has endured for nearly two decades. Once criticized for his collaboration with Islamabad, Bugti’s death transformed him into a symbol of resistance, reviving separatist demands that had largely faded since General Zia’s rapprochement with Baloch dissidents in the 1980s.

-Rather than quelling unrest, the state’s reliance on brutal suppression has only deepened grievances and strengthened resistance. Baloch insurgent groups operate within a broader political spectrum, with demands ranging from greater cultural, economic, and political rights to full autonomy or outright secession. Despite this diversity, the Pakistani military has consistently conflated all Baloch demands with separatism, branding legitimate grievances as anti-Pakistan nationalism.

-This indiscriminate approach has not only failed to address underlying issues but has also reinforced the insurgents’ resolve, perpetuating a cycle of violence and state repression.

-The Pakistani state’s entrenched sense of superiority and colonial mindset has further exacerbated the crisis in Balochistan. Rather than learning from past failures, the military persists with its oppressive tactics, including the detention of critics without due process, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings in military camps. Since 2021, fatalities have steadily increased, reaching 322 in 2024.

-While the frequency of attacks has declined, the rising fatalities are partially attributed to the insurgents’ growing use of suicide attacks, which they perceive as a more effective means of resistance.

-Though the majority of Baloch people remain uninvolved in violent actions, a small yet significant segment of the middle class­—including women—has joined militant groups like the BLA, with some even becoming part of its suicide wing, the Majeed Brigade.

-Despite the existence of a counterinsurgency strategy on paper, the government has failed to address the root causes of the conflict or win over the Baloch people. Instead, the military continues to rely on colonial-era tactics, such as collective punishment, in place of any meaningful effort at reconciliation.

-This strategy often includes promoting vigilantism, sometimes sectarian, to divide Baloch society. Two death squads, operating with state sanction—the Tehreek-e-Nefaz-e-Aman Balochistan, led by Siraj Raisani, and the Baloch Musla Defai Tanzeem, headed by Shafiq Mengal—have been reportedly involved in abducting and killing Baloch activists.

-The persistence of the insurgency, now approaching two decades, underscores the failure of harsh tactics to suppress opposition. While the insurgency continues to escalate, there has been a notable shift in the mobilization of Baloch society, particularly among the middle class.

-This group has increasingly demanded political reform and adherence to constitutional rights, utilizing peaceful methods like protests and petitions rather than violence.

-This shift is a response to the intensifying repression, which often targets nonviolent opposition. The scale of this repression is reflected in the disputed figures for missing persons.

-Baloch sources claim up to 7,000 cases, while the Government of Pakistan’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances reports 2,752. Irrespective of the precise figure,

-Human Rights Watch has condemned Pakistani security forces for committing “serious human rights violations,” including arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial executions. Rather than engaging with the growing middle class, the military has responded with further hostility, deepening the alienation of Baloch society.

‘You cannot use fire to shut down a fire!’ This strategy is bound to be a failure and Pak Army should realize the same!

On 25-26 August 2024, more than 70 people – including 23 civilians – were reported killed and key infrastructure damaged in a series of attacks across Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan. The armed separatist group, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), has claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Created in the early 2000s, the BLA, together with other militant groups, has waged a decades-long campaign against Pakistan’s government which is accused of unfairly appropriating Balochistan’s rich gas and mineral reserves. Severe economic deprivation has compounded these grievances.

The attacks raised serious questions about recent government claims that the Baloch insurgency and its leadership are significantly weakened.

While the attacks were widely blamed on intelligence failures, they also raised serious questions about government claims that the Baloch insurgency and its leadership are significantly weakened. The scale of these closely coordinated attacks suggests otherwise.

Not only do they point to an insurgency that appears to be far from over, but also to a still robust and sophisticated militant organization with ambitions to widen its appeal by tapping into Baloch nationalist sentiment. The BLA’s attacks were timed to coincide with the anniversary of the death of the influential Baloch tribal leader, Akbar Khan Bugti, who was killed in a confrontation with Pakistani security forces on 26 August 2006.

The attacks have prompted concern about the risks posed to major infrastructure projects located in Balochistan, including the development of the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar, part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and a planned mining operation at Reqo Dik in Chagai district. Such projects are targets of Baloch resentment and in recent years almost a dozen Chinese nationals have been killed by Baloch militants in Balochistan and elsewhere in Pakistan.

Added to these concerns are fears of fresh tension between Pakistan and its regional neighbours. In January, the BLA was at the centre of allegations by Pakistan over the use of militant bases in Iran to stage attacks against Pakistan. They led to tit-for-tat cross-border missile and air strikes that almost brought Iran and Pakistan to the brink of war. Pakistan has again blamed regional neighbours, notably India, for supporting the latest attacks as a move to undermine CPEC and frighten other foreign investors.

Pakistan has also levelled allegations against the Taliban government in Afghanistan for fuelling militant violence through its support for the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and its allies, including the BLA.

What is new about this insurgency?

There is mounting evidence of a shift in the composition and pattern of the current phase of the Baloch insurgency, making its trajectory hard to predict.

The most significant change is the involvement of a growing number of educated middle-class professionals who are transforming the insurgency from a movement dominated by traditional tribal chiefs to one with greater popular appeal. The BLA, in particular, is said to have become a magnet for such groups, who favour ‘modern and unconventional’ thinking.

There is also the increasing involvement of women, a radical departure in one of Pakistan’s most socially conservative provinces. On 26 August the BLA released images of a woman law student from Gwadar who it said was the suicide bomber responsible for the attacks on a paramilitary base in Lasbela. In April 2022, a Baloch woman with a graduate degree in medicine was identified as the suicide bomber who killed three Chinese nationals at the University of Karachi.

The most significant change is the involvement of a growing number of educated middle-class professionals who are transforming the insurgency from a movement dominated by traditional tribal chiefs to one with greater popular appeal. There is also the rise of an increasingly vocal Baloch rights-based movement, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC or Baloch Unity Committee), composed mainly of women activists and led by the charismatic young female doctor, Mahrang Baloch. Dedicated to non-violence, it aims to raise national awareness of extra-judicial killings and so-called ‘enforced disappearances’ involving ethnic Baloch. An estimated 5,000 Baloch are said to have gone missing since 2000.

Another trend within the current insurgency is the creeping xenophobia and hostility towards non-Baloch ethnic groups, many of whom are drawn to Balochistan from elsewhere in Pakistan by the prospect of economic opportunities and work on local projects.

Ethnic Punjabis, who tend to dominate the security forces, have been especially vulnerable to local resentment. In the latest attacks, all the civilians reported killed by the BLA were identified as Punjabi workers, which seems to confirm concerns they are being deliberately targeted by militants. Much of the hostility against migrant workers is rooted in the fears of ethnic Baloch that they could be reduced to a minority in the province or lose out in competition for jobs to relatively better qualified workers from Punjab.

New trends:

It comes following the June announcement of a new counter-insurgency operation – the latest of many – designed to contain militant threats from Baloch insurgents and the TTP.. Some have questioned its capacity to deliver where other such strategies have failed, while others believe it was devised in response to pressure from China to beef up security for Chinese-led projects.

But there were other signs before the attacks that the military was gearing up for confrontation with Baloch dissidents. In a veiled reference to the BYC, which staged an unprecedented wave of non-violent demonstrations across Balochistan in July, army chief General Asim Munir warned that action by ‘some elements’ to ‘destabilize Balochistan’ would not be allowed. In early August, a senior military spokesman denounced the BYC as a proxy of terrorist organizations.

Pressing ahead with a militarized security approach to address the crisis in Balochistan is a worrying indication that lessons from the past have not been learned. All signs point to a dangerous replay of past mistakes, whereby political engagement is dismissed in favour of political management: backing groups that owe their existence to the military and will do its bidding.

In the face of an increasingly sophisticated insurgency with the power to extend its reach across vast swathes of civil society in Balochistan, resorting to brute force is no longer an option – if it ever was.

The outcomes of the 2018 and 2024 elections, which installed provincial governments in Balochistan with close ties to the military, stand as damning testimony to these misjudged priorities.

Ultimately, the escalating violence and continuing turmoil in Balochistan is a reflection of the abject failure to provide meaningful representation to the Baloch and to address their grievances which have simmered since the inception of Pakistan in 1947.

In the face of an increasingly sophisticated insurgency with the power to extend its reach across vast swathes of civil society in Balochistan, resorting to brute force is no longer an option – if it ever was. The only way forward lies in opening channels of communication with genuine representatives accountable to the people of Balochistan rather than to Pakistan’s armed custodians of power.